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HAMMER V. GROSS: POUNDING 
OUT A NEW STANDARD IN 
EXCESSIVE FORCE ACTIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Hammer v. GrossI, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the proper question for the jury in an action arising under 
42 U.S.C. Section 19832 alleging excessive force by a police offi-
cer, is whether the level of force employed was objectively rea-
sonable in light ofthe facts and circumstances at the time of the 
incident.3 In reaching its decision, the court applied the analy-
sis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Connor.' The en bane panel also clarified prior decisions regard-
ing FRCP 516, reaffirming that there is no "plain error" excep-
tion in civil cases in the Ninth Circuit.6 The Court also held that 
under the circumstances, the arresting officer and police chief 
were entitled to qualified immunity from the Section 1983 
claim, but that the City of Newport Beach was not. 7 
II. FACTS 
On June 23, 1985, plaintiff Timothy Hammer was arrest-
ed by Newport Beach police officer Armando Zatarain, upon 
probable cause,s for driving under the influence of alcoho1.9 
1. 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc, per Canby, J., Farris, J., and Schroeder, 
J.; Kozinski, J., and Nelson, J., concurring in part, except to section III of the court's 
opinion; Reinhardt, J., specially concurring except to section IV of the court's opinion; 
Beezer, J., Browning, J., Fernandez, J., Goodman, J., Thompson, J., dissenting.). 
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for discussion of Section 1983. 
3. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d at 846. 
4. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). See infra note 37 and accompanying text for full discus-
sion of the Graham decision. 
5. See note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of Rule 51. 
6. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 848.· 
7. [d. at 850-51. See infra section IV, subsection A(4) for a discussion of quali-
fied immunity for Office Zatarain and Chief of Police Gross. 
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Zatarain told Hammer that he would be required to take a blood, 
urine or breath test to determine his blood alcohol content as man-
dated by California Vehicle Code Section 23157.10 Hammer refused. 11 
Zatarain drove Hammer to a Newport Beach Hospital.12 There, 
Zatarain handcuffed Hammer by his right wrist to a hard plastic 
chair and asked Hammer whether he would submit to a blood 
test. 13 When Hammer verbally refused, Zatarain told a laboratory 
technician to withdraw a blood sample despite Hammer's 
objections. l' Hammer claimed that Zatarain grabbed his shoulders 
from behind and pinned him to the chair while the technologist 
swabbed his forearm with iodine. 16 Hammer jumped when the 
technologist attempted to insert the needle.16 As Hammer tried to 
wrestle away from the needle, Zatarain attempted to immobilize 
him and the two tumbled sideways to the floor, with Hammer 
twisting his back as he hit the ground. 17 Zatarain lifted Hammer 
off the floor and told him that the blood would be extracted "the 
10. 1d. See Cal. Veh. Code Section 23157 (Deering, 1987) which provides in per-
tinent part: 
Any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have 
given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her 
blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the 
alcoholic content of his or her blood .... 
11. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844. Hammer later testified that he did so because he 
felt there was a good possibility that the tests would indicate intoxication. [d. See Cal. 
Veh. Code § 13353 (Deering, 1987) which provides in pertinent part: 
[i]f any person refuses an officer's request to submit to, or 
fails to complete a chemical test or tests pursuant to § 
23157, upon receipt of the officer's sworn statement that 
the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person 
had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of § 23152 
or 23153 and that the person had refused to submit to, or 
did not complete, the test or tests after being requested 
by the officer, the department shall (1) suspend the per-
son's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 6 months, (2) 
revoke the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 
2 years if the person has been convicted of a separate vio-
lation of § 23103 as specified in §§ 23103.5, 23152 or 
23153 within 5 years of the date of refusal, or (3) revoke 
the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 3 
years if the person has been convicted of2 or more sepa-
rate violations of § 23103 as specified in §§ 23103.5, 
23152 or 23153, or any combination thereof, within 5 
years of the date of refusal. 
12. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844. 
13. [d. 
14. 1d. Hammer later testified that he refused the blood test because he does not 
like needles. 1d. 
15. 1d. Zatarain denied having touched Hammer from the time Hammer was first 
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easy way or the hard way. "18 Hammer then agreed to take a 
breathalyzer test, but Zatarain insisted on the blood test and held 
Hammer in the chair as the blood was withdrawn.19 
On September 23, 1985, Hammer filed a Section 1983 action20 
claiming violation of his constitutional rights. 21 Following a 
three-day trial,22 a jury awarded Hammer compensatory and 
punitive damages against Zatarain and Newport Beach Chief 
of Police Charles Gross, as well as compensatory damages 
against the City of Newport Beach.23 On appeal, a three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial judge 
had erred in denying defendants' motions for directed verdict 
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 24 Upon Hammer's 
petition, the Ninth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc.26 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A SECTION 1983 ACTION ARISING 
FROM A CLAIM OF EXCESSIVE FORCE 
Section 198326 came into existence as Section 1 of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.27 It was enacted to provide a 
18. [d. Zatarain called two other officers into the room, threatening to throw 
Hammer to the floor and pin him down in order to obtain the blood sample. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for discussion of Section 1983. 
21. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 843-44. 
22. Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200 at 1202 (9th Cir. 1989). The defendants had 
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the individual defendants were entitled 
to qualified immunity and that because Officer Zatarain was no closer than five feet 
from Hammer during the blood withdrawal, there was no genuine issue of material 
fact. The District Court denied the motion. At the close of the trial, the defendants 
moved for a directed verdict, which was also denied. [d. 
23. [d. The court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. [d. 
24. [d. at 1200-08. The court based its reversal on its finding that the amount of 
force applied by Zatarain was minimal and did not exceed the amount necessary to effect 
the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The court found that Zatarain's conduct was 
not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. [d. at 1208. 
25. Hammer v. Gross, 902 F.2d at 774. 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
27. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,171 (1961). The Monroe opinion discusses R.S. 
§ 1979. The statutory language in R.S. 1979 is identical to the language used in 42 
3
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remedy for a citizen whose constitutional rights had been vio-
lated by abuses of official power.28 The provision was enacted 
with "three main aims. "29 The first of these was to override state 
legislation which was adverse to the rights or privileges of cit-
izens of the United States. SO The second purpose was to provide 
a remedy where state law was inadequate.31 The legislation was 
also intended "to provide a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in prac-
tice. "32 This final purpose was largely a reaction to the activities 
of the Ku Klux Klan and the lawless conditions existing in the 
South in 1871.33 Congressional debate over Section 1 of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act makes clear that one reason for the provision 
was to create a right enforceable in federal courts. This was nec-
essary because, by reason of "prejudice, passion, neglect, intol-
erance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the 
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and 
immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment might 
be denied by the state agencies. "34 The intent of Section 1983 
was not solely to provide compensation to victims of abuses of 
official power, but also to serve as a deterrent against such 
future constitutional infringements.36 
U.S.C. § 1983. Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(42 USCS § 1983) Providing Private Rights of Action For Violation of Federal Rights, 
43 L.Ed. 2d 833, 839. 
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. 
29. [d. at 173. 
30. [d. (Citing Congo Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 268). 
31. [d. In 1871, when the Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted, many state laws were 
prejudicial toward blacks. For example, several states would not allow a black man 
to testify in any case against a white man. [d. at 174. 
32. [d. at 174. The Court stated that it was the "failure of certain States to enforce 
the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum" behind the pas-
sage of the Ku Klux Klan Act. [d. at 174-75. 
33. [d. at 176. Senator Osborn of Florida stated to Congress: 
That the State courts in the several States have been 
unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective 
States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact that 
the preservation oflife and property in many sections of the 
country is beyond the power of the State government, is a 
sufficient reason why Congress should ... enact the laws 
necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States. 
(Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653.) 
34. [d. at 180. 
35. Owen V. City ofIndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Plaintiff brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his rights to procedural and substantive 
due process after having been discharged from his position as Chief of Police of 
defendant City. [d. at 626. The City gave no reason for the dismissal, plaintiff having 
received only a written notice that the dismissal was made pursuant to a provision of 
the city charter. [d. The Eighth Circuit court held that a municipality has no 
4
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In Hammer, the Ninth Circuit panel applied the analysis 
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Connor36 for determining whether force utilized by a state 
agent is excessive. The Graham Court rejected the fourteenth 
amendment substantive due process approach established in 
Rochin v. California37 and rejected prior appellate court rulings 
which interpreted Rochin as requiring a substantive analysis 
of a law enforcement officer's motives in determining whether 
excessive force was utilized.3S The Court set forth a new stan-
dard of review for excessive force claims against law enforcement 
officers under Section 1983.39 In Graham, the Court stated that 
immunity from § 1983 and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to 
such liabilities. [d. at 651. 
36. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Plaintiff Graham, wrongly suspected of wrongdoing in 
a convenience store, was apprehended by defendant Connor, who ignored his claims 
of being diabetic. [d. at 389. Graham momentarily lost consciousness, was shoved by 
several officers face first into the hood of the patrol car and thrown head first into the 
car by four officers. [d. The Court held that claims of excessive force by a government 
official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard. 
[d. at 395. 
37. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion.) (Overruled by 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S 386). The Rochin Court considered whether the forceful 
extraction of the contents of a suspect's stomach by order of police officers, in order 
to obtain evidence against the suspect, violated the fourteenth amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Rochin at 168-74. The Court observed that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees respect for those personal 
immunities which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental." [d at 169, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934). The Court set forth the test that conduct which "shocks the conscience" vio-
lates the due process guidelines set forth in the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 172-74. 
The Graham Court rejected the Rochin analysis in favor of analysis under the fourth 
amendment and its reasonableness standard. Graham, 490 U.S. 386 at 393-95. 
38. In Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 
(1973), the Second Circuit interpreted the Rochin test to mean that the court must 
consider "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and 
the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted and whether force 
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." [d. at 1033 (emphasis added). Two 
years after the decision, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Johnson substantive due 
process test in Meredith v. State of Arizona 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975). In Meredith, 
the court held that an unprovoked assault and battery by a guard upon a state 
prisoner was a violation of that prisoner's right to due process. [d. at 484. The court 
stated that in light of Johnson, conduct under color of state law that can be fairly 
characterized as "intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to human dignity" 
violates the victim's right to substantive due process. [d. The Johnson test found more 
recent Ninth Circuit affirmation in Rutherford v. City of Berkeley 780 F.2d 1444 (9th 
Cir.1986). 
39. Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 393-99. The Graham court recognized that the lower 
federal courts had applied the Johnson substantive due process test indiscriminate-
ly to all Section 1983 excessive force claims against law enforcement officers, without 
considering whether the use of force might fall under a more specific constitutional 
right. [d. at 393. The court rejected the view that Section 1983 excessive force claims 
should be governed by the substantive due process standard. [d. at 393-94. 
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analysis of such a claim should commence by identifying the spe-
cific constitutional right allegedly violated by the use of force. 40 
The Court rejected the validity of the Rochin analysis,41 and held 
that all claims alleging the use of excessive force by law enforce-
ment officers during arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure42 
should be analyzed under the fourth amendment4S and its rea-
sonableness standard, as opposed to the fourteenth amend-
ment substantive due process approach.44 
The Graham Court also considered the level of force which 
would be considered unreasonable under the fourth amendment 
standard.46 This analysis must allow for the fact that law 
enforcement officers are often forced, in tense and rapidly 
evolving situations, to make split-second determinations of the 
amount of force required under the circumstances.46 The ques-
tion to be addressed is whether the actions of the officer are 
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, 
without consideration of the officer's intent or motivation.47 The 
Court concluded that the four-part test of Johnson v. Glick,46 
which considers whether the officer acted "in good faith" or 
40. Id. at 394. 
41. Id. at 395. See supra note 37 for discussion of the Rochin analysis. The 
Graham court stated that it was making explicit what was implicit in the analysis set 
forth in Tennessee v. Garner. 471 U.S. 1 (1985». In Garner, a case involving the use 
of excessive force by the police, the Court held that in order to determine whether a 
seizure is reasonable, and thus constitutional, the nature and quality of the intrusion 
on the individual's fourth amendment rights must be balanced against the govern-
mental interests supporting the intrusion. Id. at 8. 
42. A ·seizure," triggering the protection of the Fourth Amendment, occurs 
when a government official, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains 
the liberty of a citizen. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n. 16 (1968). 
43. U.S. Con st. amend. IV states: 
The rights of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search-
es and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
44. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Court bases this stance on the fact that the 
fourth amendment is an explicit constitutional protection from physically intrusive 
government conduct, as opposed to the more general notion of substantive due process. 
Id. 
45. Id. at 396. 
46. Id. at 396-97, see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. (Holding that the facts of a 
particular case must be judged against the objective standard of whether the 
information available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search would war-
rant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.) 
47. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
48. See supra, note 38, for discussion of the Johnson test. 
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"maliciously and sadistically," has no place in a proper fourth 
amendment analysis.,g Such sUbjective motivations have no 
bearing on whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under 
the fourth amendment.6o 
The analysis developed in Graham considers only whether 
the level of force applied by the officer was objectively rea-
sonable in light of circumstances existing at the time of the inci-
dent. The analysis is to be applied by the jury, free from all 
subjective considerations. 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 51 IN 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Rule 5pl of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
designed to bring possible errors to the attention of the court 
while there is still time to correct them without the cost, delay 
and expenditure of judicial resources necessitated by retrials. 62 
Circuits other than the Ninth have adopted a "plain error" 
exception to FRCP Rule 51, similar to the "plain error" excep-
tion found in Rule 52(b)63 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.64 Although Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure shares a common purpose with Rule 51 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no statutory "plain error" rule 
is found with regard to civillitigation.66 In Bertrand v. Southern 
49. Id. 
50.Id. 
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 provides in pertinent part: 
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction unless that party objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating dis-
tinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of objection. 
52. See Bertrand v. Southern Pacific Co., 282 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 365 U.S. 816 (1961). 
53. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) provides: 
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court. 
Rule 52(b) is applicable in conjunction with and as an exception to Fed. R. Crim. P. 
30, which provides in pertinent part: 
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission [in an instruction to the jury] unless that party 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects 
and the grounds of the objection. 
54. See e.g., Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1966); Ramsey v. 
Travelers, 317 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1963). 
55. See Hargrave v. Wellman, 276 F.2d 948, 950 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1960). 
7
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Pacific,56 the court stated that regardless of other circuits' 
rules, in the Ninth Circuit the plain error rule may not be 
applied in civil appeals in order to review jury instructions 
where the ground asserted was not raised at tria1.57 
Most circuits, excluding the Ninth Circuit, have stated in 
dicta that an appellate court may reverse for plain error in an 
instruction to which no objection was made.56 These state-
ments, however, recognize that such power is to be exercised 
only where necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice.69 
The Ninth Circuit stated one possible exception to its strict 
enforcement of Rule 51 in Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc v. Budget 
Rent-A-Car Systems,f,o There, the court stated that ifit is aware 
of a party's concerns with an instruction and further objection 
would serve no purpose, the party will not be required to take part 
in the "pointless formality" of lodging a formal objection.61 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
1. Standard for Analysis of a Section 1983 Claim Arising 
From Excessive Use of Force 
In determining that the proper question for the jury in an 
excessive force claim is whether an arresting officer's use of 
force was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances 
existing at the time of the incident,62 the Hammer court com-
menced its analysis by considering whether the facts of the case 
were sufficient to sustain the jury verdict for Hammer.63 The 
56. 282 F.2d 569, 572. 
57. [d. 
58. C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2558, at 672 
(1971). See e.g. Nimrod v. Sylvester, 369 F.2d 870, 873 (1st Cir. 1966). 
59. [d. 
60. 732 F.2d 1403, 1410 (9th Cir. 1984). 
61. [d. In Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth 
Circuit was presented with an appeal of a Section 1983 case arising out of the use of 
excessive force. At trial, the district court had instructed the jury that in determin-
ing whether excessive force was used, it should consider if the force was applied in good 
faith or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. [d. at 820. On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the Johnson v. Glick instruction was plain 
error, but observed that the force utilized in the case was not excessive, thus avoid-
ing the need to permit a "plain error" exception. [d. 
62. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. 
63. [d. at 846-47. 
8
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court observed that under Schmerber v. California,64 it is not 
a violation of the fourth amendment for police, with probable 
cause but without a warrant, to extract a blood sample from an 
individual suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, 
who had been arrested and hospitalized, and who had refused 
to take a breathalyzer test." The Ninth Circuit observed that 
the Schmerber court emphasized the routine nature of the 
test and the fact that it was performed by a physician in a hos-
pital. 66 Additionally, the Schmerber Court took pains to limit 
its holding to the facts of the case.67 The Ninth Circuit reject-
ed the defense's argument that the Schmerber decision neces-
sarily legitimized the use of force to overcome resistance to a 
procedure which the police are entitled to use." The Court 
observed that the crucial question was whether a rational 
jury could conclude that the force used on Hammer was exces-
sive under the circumstances.69 
64. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The plaintiff had been arrested upon probable cause for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. [d. at 758. At a hospital, a physician, on direc-
tion of the arresting police officer, withdrew a blood sample from the plaintiff, despite 
his verbal refusal to such.ld. at 759. There is no suggestion in Schmerber of any phys-
ical resistance by the suspect or use of force by the police. Hammer 932 F.2d at 844. 
65. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844-845, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72. 
66. Id. at 845. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1956), the court permitted 
the withdrawal of blood from a hospitalized, unconscious subject. The court stated that 
"there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done 
... under the protective eye of a physician." Id. at 435. 
67. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772). The Hammer 
court observed that the plaintiff did not seek an alternative blood alcohol content test 
on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruples. See Schmerber 384 U.S. 
at 771. 
68. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. While no force was utilized in Schmerber, the defen-
dants in Hammer argued that the decision legitimized the use of force to overcome resis-
tance to a procedure which the defendants were entitled to employ.ld. They asserted 
that the Schmerber court could not have intended a rule which would give no weight 
to a suspect's verbal objection, but would give effect to an objection accompanied by 
physical resistance. Id. In support of this argument, the defendants cited a footnote 
in Schmerber: 
We "cannot see that it should make any difference whether 
one states unequivocally that he objects or resorts to phys-
ical violence in protest or is in such condition that he is 
unable to protest." (Citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 
at 441 (Warren, C.J. dissenting». It would be a different case 
if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a rea-
sonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or 
responded to resistance with inappropriate force. Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 760 n. 4. 
69. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. The Court assumed for the purpose of its decision 
that Schmerber does not preclude the use of force to extract a blood sample from a 
resistant suspect in some situations. Id. The defendants contended that the force to 
which Hammer was subjected was not excessive because, as Hammer admitted, it did 
not rise to a level that "shocks the conscience," Id., the measure of what constitutes 
9
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The test for determining whether the force employed was 
excessive was stated in Graham v. Connor. 70 The Graham 
Court held that claims of excessive force by a government 
official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment and 
its reasonableness standard, as opposed to a fourteenth amend-
ment substantive due process approach.71 Under this test, the 
trier of fact must ask whether the "officers' actions are 'objec-
tively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances con-
fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation."72 The test balances "'the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests 
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. "73 
The reasonableness of the use of force is "judged from the per-
spective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. "74 
2. Application of Graham Analysis 
Although Graham had not been decided at the time of 
Hammer's 1985 arrest, the Ninth Circuit observed that under 
the test applied in Reed v. Hoy,76 the Graham analysis is to be 
applied retroactively.76 Ordinarily, the Ninth Circuit will 
retroactively apply a decision reformulating federal civil 
law. 77 However, in certain cases, retroactive application of 
new case law may produce an inequitable result.76 In Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Huson79 , the Supreme Court set forth an analysis for 
determining whether new case law should be applied 
retroactively.so Under this analysis, the Graham standard 
excessive force formulated in Rochin. The measure of excessive force set forth in Rochin 
was overruled by the Supreme Court in Graham, 490 U.S. 386. 
70. 490 U.S. 386. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for discussion of 
Graham. 
71. [d. at 395. This standard applies whether the officer is making an arrest, 
investigatory stop or other seizure of a free citizen. [d. 
72. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). 
73. [d. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
74. Hammer, 932 F.2d 846 (citing Graham 490 U.S. at 396). 
75. 909 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991). The court 
held that in determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively, a court 
must consider the three factors set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-
107 (1971) (See note 80 infra, for discussion of the Chevron analysis.) 
76. [d. at 327-328. 
77. Austin v. City of Bisbee, 855 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1988), (citing Mineo 
v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 779 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1986». 
78. Reed, 909 F.2d at 327. 
79. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
80. [d. Under the Chevron analysis, new case law should be applied only 
prospectively if it (1) establishes a new principal of law, by overruling clear past 
10
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was properly applied retroactive to the time of Hammer's 
arrest. 81 
In light of the Graham decision, the question facing the 
Ninth Circuit became whether a rational jury could find that 
the defendants' use of force to overcome Hammer's resistance 
and extract a blood sample was not "objectively reasonable in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. "82 
While Hammer did forcibly resist the blood test, which he 
had no right to do, his offense was only a misdemeanor.83 The 
plurality stressed that Hammer posed no threat to the officer 
or to others at the hospitaV14 Perhaps most important, however, 
is the fact that Hammer, prior to the extraction of blood, 
agreed to submit to a breathalyzer test.86 If an alternative 
test is available and requested by the suspect, a police officer 
may not arbitrarily refuse to administer such simply because 
the suspect did not make the decision more promptly or had a 
change of mind. 88 The defendants argued that Hammer's 
precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impres. 
sion whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) states a rule whose retro-
spective operation will retard rather than further its operation, considering the 
rule's prior history and its purpose and effect; (3) is a decision whose retroactive appli-
cation could produce substantial inequitable results, and for which a holding of non-
retroactivity would avoid injustice or hardship. Id. at 106-07. 
81. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. While Graham does overrule past Ninth Circuit 
precedent, the United States Supreme Court states in that decision that it was "mak-
ing explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis .... " (Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). 
Therefore, the Court did not view its decision in Graham as establishing a new prin-
ciple of law. Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, Graham may be 
applied retroactively under the first element of the three-part Chevron test. Because 
Graham furthers the essential purpose of the fourth amendment - guaranteeing that 
citizens are "secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures of the per-
son" (U.S. Const. amend IV) - retroactive application of the decision will further rather 
than retard the policies announced therein. Id. Thus, retroactive application is 
acceptable under the second of the Chevron tests. Additionally, retroactive applica-
tion of Graham will not result in any substantially inequitable results. Id. The pri-
mary factor to be considered with regard to whether substantial inequities will 
result, is whether a party has reasonably relied on a law which was later invalidat-
ed. Id. The Graham decision surmounts the effect of the third factor in the Chevron 
test. 
82. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). 
83. Id. at 846. 
84. Id. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating that the proper application of the 
test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment requires consideration of whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and others). 
85. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. In his concurring opinion, Judge Kozinski stated 
that a decision for Hammer should turn solely on this fact. Id. at 851. 
86. 1d. at 852. Judge Kozinski points out that the defense offered no evidence that 
Hammer's consent came too late 4ue to the ineffectiveness or unavailability of an alter-
native test. Id. 
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consent to the breathalyzer test was not given in good faith and 
was an attempt to create further delay.87 While recognizing that 
this was possible, the Ninth Circuit held that the jury could 
have concluded that Hammer's consent was sincere, rendering 
any further use of force unreasonable.88 Upon considering 
these factors, and the fact that "the integrity of an individual's 
person is a cherished value of our society, "89 the Ninth Circuit 
panel held that the question of reasonableness of force by the 
defendants, under the circumstances of the case, was a prop-
er question for the jury.90 
3. FRCP Rule 51 in the Ninth Circuit 
Despite the Hammer court's holding that the issue of rea-
sonableness of force was a proper question for the jury, the 
defendants argued that the jury verdict should not stand 
because the jury was led to believe that force could never be 
properly utilized to extract a blood sample.91 The jury was 
instructed to apply the due process test of unreasonable force 
which was set out in Johnson v. Glick92 and subsequently 
rejected by Graham.93 The "malicious and sadistic" element of 
the Johnson analysis puts in question the subjective motives 
of an officer which, according to Graham, does not bear upon 
whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.94 The Ninth Circuit panel agreed that this factor 
could have led the Hammer jury to find that force had been 
applied with an improper intent, rendering the use of force 
impermissible.96 
The court maintained, however, that despite the improper 
jury instruction, the defendants failed to object to the 
87. [d. at 846. The Schmerber Court noted that the percentage of alcohol in the 
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body eliminates it from 
the system. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
88. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. 
89. [d., (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.) 
90. [d. At trial, the Judge denied defendants' motions for a directed verdict 
and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Hammer, 884 F.2d 1200 at 1202. On 
first appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that because Hammer failed to establish that he 
had been deprived of any fourth amendment right, the trial judge had erred in deny-
ing the defendants' motions. [d. at 1202-1208. 
91. [d. at 846-47. 
92. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). See supra note 38 for discussion of the Johnson 
test. 
93. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397. 
94. [d. 
95. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 847. 
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instruction and did not make known any concern with the 
lower court's due process excessive force instruction.96 Thus, 
they were in no position to complain about it.97 The Ninth 
Circuit, as the strictest enforcer of Rule 51,98 has declared 
that there is no plain error exception for civil cases in the cir-
cuit." In Hammer, the court again maintained its standing as 
a firm enforcer of Rule 51, stating that its position has spared 
it the "burden of having to review afterthought claims of errors 
in the instructions" which counsel sought to pursue under the 
auspices of plain error. 100 In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Reinhardt urged the court to relax its approach to the enforce-
ment of Rule 51, and "join other circuits in adopting a more flex-
ible and reasonable approach."lol 
4. Qualified Immunity for Zatarain and Gross 
With regard to Hammer's claims against Chief of Police 
Gross and the City of Newport Beach, the defendants con-
tended that even if officer Zatarain were found to have used 
excessive force, there was no evidence that Gross or the City 
sanctioned such as a policy.l02 Chief Gross testified that during 
his tenure, he was responsible for establishing the policies of 
the Newport Beach Police Department. los When a suspect 
refused all three blood alcohol content tests, the City's policy 
was that blood could be forcibly extracted, so long as the force 
did not "shock the conscience."l04 The decision of whether to uti-
lize force in order to obtain a blood sample was left to the 
officers' discretion. l06 From Gross' testimony and the corrobo-
rating testimony of a witnessl06 who had previously been 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. See C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2558, at 674 
(1971): 
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in reading Civil Rule 51 
literally and denying that there is any power to reverse 
for plain error in an unobjected-to instruction in a civil 
case. 
99. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 847. 
100. [d. at 848 (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
Section 2558 at 674-75). 
101. [d. at 851 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
102. [d. at 849. 
103. [d. 
104. [d., see also Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
105. Hamme,., 932 F.2d at 850. 
106. Witness Bohunis testified that several months prior to the Hammer arrest, 
he had been apprehended by Officer Zatarain and, after being unable to complete a 
13
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apprehended by Officer Zatarain, the court concluded that 
the jury could have reasonably found that Chief Gross had 
established a policy which permitted the use of force over and 
above a level reasonable under the circumstances. l07 
Defendants Zatarain and Gross argued that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability as a 
matter of law. 108 The defendants would be immune from liability 
if reasonable officers in their position, in light of clearly estab-
lished law, could have reasonably believed that their actions 
were lawful. l09 The panel in Hammer conceded that the stan-
dard of review under Graham, as applied to this case, can 
result in a jury finding that force is excessive, although it did 
not rise to a level that shocks the conscience. l1o However, at the 
time of Hammer's arrest, Graham had not yet been decided. 
The Ninth Circuit ruled in Hammer that because a reasonable 
officer would not have anticipated the Graham ruling, officers 
Zatarain and Gross were immune from personal liability for 
their actions. 111 Despite the fact that the force which Zatarain 
applied and Gross authorized was unreasonable, it was 
well below the level that shocks the conscience. 112 Citing 
Owen v. City of Independence, 113 in which the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a municipality may not assert the 
good faith of its officers as a defense to Section 1983 liabil-
Ity, the Hammer court refused to extend the granting of 
immunity to the City of Newport BeachY4 
In light of the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Hammer, and the 
fact that the City of Newport Beach was not entitled to 
breathalyzer test, was subjected to a blood extraction over his resistance by the sub-
stantial forcible efforts of seven officers. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. At the time of Hammer's arrest both Breithaupt, 352 U.S. 432, and 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, had been decided. Breithaupt permitted the withdrawal of 
blood when the hospitalized subject was unconscious. Breithaupt at 436-39. That deci-
sion adopted the rule of Rochin; force that "shocks the conscience" violates substan-
tive due process. Id. (Hammer concedes that the Rochin standard was not violated by 
Zatarain and Gross. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850). See note 64 and accompanying text 
for discussion of Schmerber. 
110. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The Court observed that the knowledge that a munic-
ipality will be held liable for all of its injurious conduct should create an incentive for 
officials who have doubts regarding the lawfulness of their actions to minimize the like-
lihood of infringements on the constitutional rights of citizens. Id. at 651-52. 
114. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 850. 
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immunity, the court vacated the decision of the three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit, and reinstated the jury verdict 
against the City of Newport Beach for compensatory damages 
of $2,500. 116 
B. DISSENT 
In his dissent, Judge Fernandez, joined by Judges 
Browning, Goodwin, Bezer and Thompson, noted that under the 
authority of Schmerber, the extraction of blood can be car-
ried out without a warrant in order to preserve transient evi-
dence. 116 Fernandez emphasized that under Graham, police 
are permitted to use some physical force in order to extract a 
blood sample.117 The dissent contended that in light of that ele-
ment of Graham, the fourth amendment did not prohibit 
Officer Zatarain from exerting force in order to obtain the 
blood sample. 118 Pointing to the fact that Officer Zatarain did 
not initiate the physical contact and used no more physical force 
than minimally necessary to obtain the blood sample, the dis-
senting Judges concluded that there was no evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably conclude that Officer Zatarain 
employed excessive force in gaining the sample.119 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. JURY APPLICATION OF THE GRAHAM ANALYSIS 
The test adopted by the Hammer court to determine 
whether force used in a seizure is reasonable under the fourth 
amendment is one of objective reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances.120 However, given the nature of the analysis set out 
in Graham 121 and applied by the Ninth Circuit in Hammer, the 
fourth amendment analysis in excessive force cases is subject 
to improper application resulting from jury subjectivity.122 A 
115. [d. The case was remanded to the three-judge panel for consideration of the 
issue of attorney's fees, raised by Hammer. 




120. [d. at 845-46 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 399). 
121. See supra, notes 36-44 and accompanying text for full discussion of the 
Graham analysis. 
122. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court recognized 
that a jury's consideration of whether a defendant's conduct was outrageous had an 
15
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possible consequence is that in the hands of a jury, the analy-
sis applied in Hammer may not differ greatly in result from the 
fourteenth amendment analysis rejected by Graham. 
Because the "objectively reasonable in light of the circum-
stances" analysis cannot be applied mechanically,l23 it is entire-
ly foreseeable that a jury may hold that behavior is 
unreasonable if, in viewing the circumstances facing an officer 
at the time of the incident in question, the behavior shocks the 
consciences of individual jurors. 124 The problem is one of objec-
tivity: if an individual juror is shocked by the nature of the 
intrusion, that juror may be guided by that shock rather than 
the objectivity required by Graham. As the Hammer court 
points out, to apply the "shocks the conscience" standard is to 
employ a shorthand version of a due process test which is no 
longer applicable in analyzing the propriety of force utilized in 
effecting a search.126 
In order to allow a jury to apply the Graham test as intend-
ed by the Court, jurors should be informed of the Rochin test 
and that it has been overruled by the United States Supreme 
Court. The jurors should be admonished to look beyond the fact 
that certain behavior may be shocking to their individual con-
sciences - a task, in and of itself difficult for jurors to perform 
- and proceed with the fourth amendment analysis as set 
forth in Graham. By giving detailed instructions and educating 
the jury about the overruled Rochin analysis, the court will not 
only guide the jury to the appropriate test to apply, but will also 
explicitly warn the jurors to avoid the pitfall of unknowingly 
applying Rochin's overruled due process test. 
A question which remains regarding a jury's possible mis-
application of the Graham analysis is whether such will nec-
essarily result in unjust verdicts. While a jury may apply 
Graham's objective analysis incorrectly, being influenced by 
subjective factors, the result will not necessarily be unjust. It 
is probable that a decision based upon jurors having 
inherent subjectiveness about it. Id. at 55. Ajury might impose liability on the basis 
of the jurors' tastes or views. Id. A similar concern may arise in the consideration of 
an excessive force case where jurors may be unable apply a test in an objective man-
ner due to their individual sympathies and emotions. 
123. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
124. See supra note 37 for a discussion of the -shocks the conscience" test as set 
forth in Rochin, 342 U.S. 165. 
125. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 845. 
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unwittingly applied a "shocks the conscience" test will be equi-
table. However, because the Ninth Circuit has adopted the 
Graham analysis, the courts must give a jury detailed instruc-
tions in order to insure that the test is properly applied. 
The Graham analysis requires a balancing of the nature and 
quality of the intrusion of the individual's fourth amendment 
interests against the governmental interests at stake. 126 
Because the reasonableness aspect of the fourth amendment 
is not capable of mechanical application,127 the test of reason-
ableness requires prudent attention to the circumstances of a 
particular case. 128 This includes the severity of the crime, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the officer 
or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or 
evading arrest. 129 
The factors which a jury must consider in order to reach a 
decision under the Hammer analysis give rise to the issue of 
how a jury oflay people can judge what amount of force is rea-
sonable for an officer under particular circumstances. A sus-
pect element of the analysis is whether the jury is in a position 
to doubt what the officer believed was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances at the time of the search or seizure. The jury is to 
judge this from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. 130 The 
question which arises from this aspect ofthe analysis is whether 
it is possible for lay people to put themselves in the shoes of a 
reasonable officer who has undergone extensive police training 
and lives with the prospect of violent encounters on a daily basis. 
B. CONSIDERATION OF POLICE REPORTS 
Another factor to be considered in light of the Hammer 
decision is whether the standard of "objective reasonableness 
in light of the circumstances" will affect how an officer writes 
his report of an incident, which may be introduced as evi-
dence. 131 Police reports may be demonstrably reliable evidence 
126. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); see also Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536·37 (1967); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
703 (1983). 
127. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559). 
128. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
129. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
130. 1d. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
131. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly exclude police reports from 
the public records exception of the hearsay rule, (Fed. R. Evid. 803 (8)(B», where the 
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that an arrest was made, but they are significantly less reliable 
evidence of whether the allegations they contain of criminal 
conduct are true.132 An officer who is aware of the Hammer stan-
dard may employ language in his report, such as "under the cir-
cumstances at the time, I believed that the force used was 
reasonable." Alternatively, an officer may attempt to sanitize 
or lie in his report. Ajury, having no first-hand knowledge of 
the circumstances, should be warned against placing blind 
faith in an officer's report in determining whether that officer's 
use of force was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 
Without such an admonition, consideration of the defendant 
officer's report in an excessive force trial poses a potential 
hinderance to an equitable result. If such reports are admitted, 
the jury should be instructed as to the potential problems 
such documents may hazard. 
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME 
AT ISSUE 
In its analysis, the Hammer court adopted an element of the 
Graham test which requires the jury to consider the severity 
of the crime at issue. 133 The court stressed that Hammer's 
offense was only a misdemeanor. 134 This raises the question of 
whether the court is suggesting that an individual suspected 
of a felony is entitled to less protection by the fourth amend-
ment than an individual suspected of a misdemeanor. The 
fourth amendment makes no such distinction and in no way 
indicates that its rule should be applied differently according 
to varying degrees of the offense in question. 136 Although it ini-
tially appears that a jury instructed in this element of the 
Hammer analysis may be led to apply the fourth amendment 
in a manner never clearly indicated by the Framers, case law 
indicates otherwise. 13s Court application of the fourth 
officer is unavailable to testify, the report should be admitted as the best available evi-
dence. (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277.) 
132. United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986). "[C]ongress exhib-
ited similar doubts about the reliability of[police] reports when it specifically exclud-
ed them from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in criminal cases." [d. 
133. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. 
134. [d. 
135. See supra note 43 for the text of U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
136. See e.g., Hood v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1991) (Stating that 
holding a suspected felon pending fingerprint clearance is justifiable because the risk 
of flight or danger to the public is greater with a person charged with a felony that one 
charged with a misdemeanor.) 
18
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amendment indicates that the severity of the crime at issue 
should be considered by jurors as an element of a reasonable-
ness analysis under the fourth amendment. 
D. REASONABLENESS IN CONSIDERATION OF TRANSIENT EVIDENCE 
The Hammer analysis leaves it in the hands of the jury to 
determine what level of force, applied in order to obtain a 
blood sample from an individual suspected of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, is reasonable in light of the transient 
nature of the evidence. 1S? The dissent points out that police are 
entitled to apply some physical force in order to extract a 
blood sample from such a suspect.1SS However, Hammer did con-
sent to a breathalyzer test after refusing the extraction of a 
blood sample.139 The question arises whether, due to the tran-
sient nature of the evidence required to determine blood alco-
hol content, there should be a point at which an individual 
suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol should no 
longer be permitted to change his mind with regard to which 
test he will take. The majority held that Hammer's consent to 
take a breathalyzer test could be found by the jury to have been 
given in good faith. l40 Such a determination by the jury may 
tend to be based more on speculation than any knowledge of 
what the suspect had in mind at the time. However, a good faith 
determination, considering the totality of the circumstances at 
the time, is the best approach to this problem. An individual 
arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence must sub-
mit to an extremely intrusive blood alcohol content test, or face 
an automatic suspension of his driver's license.l4l Considering 
the intrusive nature of these procedures, it is not at all unlike-
ly that a suspect will have some difficulty choosing a test 
and experience a change of mind with regard to that decision. 
A solution to the problems that such indecision creates is for 
the courts to adopt a presumption of good faith in situations 
where suspects display such indecisiveness. The burden of 
137. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846. 
138. [d. at 854 (citing Graham at 396-97). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740 (1984), observing that a warrantless home arrest made in order to gain evidence 
of the plaintifrs blood alcohol content was violative of the fourth amendment despite 
the exigent circumstance of the transient nature of the evidence. [d. at 754. 
139. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 844. 
140. [d. at 846. 
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overcoming that presumption would be on the arresting offi-
cers, who would have to demonstrate bad faith by a prepon-
derance of evidence. 
E. RULE 51 IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in reading Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 
literally and allowing no plain error exception to the rule. 1• 2 In 
his concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt states that he would 
be inclined to take a more flexible approach to its enforce-
ment of Rule 51. 143 In Nimrod v. Sylvester,I •• the First Circuit 
stated its practice of holding the option to notice plain error of 
its own volition. 1• 6 The Nimrod court observed that the plain 
error rule should be "applied sparingly and only in exception-
al cases or under peculiar circumstances to prevent a clear mis-
carriage of justice. "1.6 
Uniform application should exist for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 147 But the Ninth Circuit has remained the 
lone opponent among the district courts to a plain error excep-
tion to Rule 51. 146 Where gross inequities would otherwise 
result, the Ninth. Circuit should take advantage of future 
opportunities to create uniform application of the plain error 
exception. It should abandon its reputation as the strictest 
enforcer of Rule 51 and take the more moderate approach 
hinted at in Reed and Eberle .1.9 While in doing so the court will 
142. See supra, notes 98·100 and accompanying text for discussion of the Ninth 
Circuit's position on a plain error exception in civil actions. 
143. Hammer, 932 F.2d at 851. Judge Reinhardt points to the Ninth Circuit deci-
sions in Reed, 909 F.2d 324, and Eberle, 901 F.2d 814. In Reed, the court found upon 
review that the trial court had committed a plain error in its jury instructions. Reed 
at 330. Counsel, however, had objected to the instruction, and the court avoided 
making a plain error exception. Id. at n. 4. See supra n. 61 and accompanying text for 
discussion of Eberle. 
144. 369 F.2d 870. 
145. 1d. at 873. 
146. 1d. 
147. "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uni-
formity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true 
of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings.· Lumbermen's 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963). 
148. See supra, note 98. 
149. See also, Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), in which dis-
senting Judge Brennan states that the absence of a plain error "provision in the Civil 
Rules suggests that review of unchallenged jury instructions is intended to be more 
restrictive that under the Criminal Rules," 1d. at 276·77 n. 7. suggesting that perhaps 
a restrictive plain error exception should apply in civil cases. 
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take on the burden of reviewing afterthought claims of error, 160 
it need not lose its strict reputation with regard to Rule 51. The 
Ninth Circuit should join the other circuits in conservatively 
granting plain error exceptions. If there is to be a uniform plain 
error exception to Rule 51, it should be "confined to the excep-
tional case where the error has seriously affected the fair-
ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."151 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Hammer v. Gross,t52 the Ninth Circuit held that Section 
1983 claims of excessive force by a police officer are to be analyzed 
under the fourth amendment and its reasonableness standard. 
Under this standard, set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Connor,l53 the jurors must determine whether 
the application offorce was objectively reasonable in light of the 
facts and circumstances facing the officer at the time. l54 
In order to insure that the jury applies the Hammer standard 
effectively, the judge presiding over an excessive force case 
should carefully instruct the jurors, not only to be certain that 
they fully understand the analysis, but also to guide them away 
from inadvertently applying the test of Rochin v. California 155 
which Graham rejected. The jury should also be admonished that 
police reports which are admitted as evidence are not a source 
of indisputable fact. In addition, the Ninth Circuit should take 
a more lenient approach to its denial of a plain error exception 
to Rule 51, allowing exceptions in instances in which to do 
otherwise would result in gross miscarriages of justice. 
While the Hammer standard is the best path to equitable 
outcomes in Section 1983 claims of excessive force, it is by no 
means an unwavering route to just results. The analysis is such 
that proper application will follow only from courts' painstak-
ing attention to clear and informative jury instructions. 
Daniel J. Goldstein* 
150. C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Section 2558, at 
674-75. 
151. [d. at 675. See also Nimrod, 369 F.2d at 873, stating that "Only the most pal-
pable of errors will be noticed on appeal when no objection was made in the district 
court." 
152. 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991). 
153. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
154. [d. at 486. 
155. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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